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After  the  terrorist  attacks  of  11  September,  the  United  States  have  become  more  inward-looking  and  more
sentimentally  patriotic.  Videos of  unsavoury  characters  like  Osama bin  Laden  have  given  rise  to  fears of  the
unknown and strengthened the call  for  a return to “American values”. Although responsible policymakers have
carefully avoided any hint of anti-Islamic sentiment, the return of values and culture as essential and core elements
of national identity are part of a wave of conservative thinking that now also seems to have reached Europe.
Since the Netherlands was widely seen as the bastion of liberal —even libertarian—thinking, it came as quite a shock
that this country seemed ready to follow the conservative populist Pim Fortuyn in the parliamentary elections of 15
May. Mr. Fortuyn’s concoction of nationalism and conservatism, all  served up with remarkable flair and audacity,
proved attractive to a significant section of the Dutch electorate (17.1%). They were not mainly  angry, white,
middle-class men, but included all  sections of Dutch society, even a significant portion of non-white voters who
seemed keen to put a halt to further immigration since this could undermine their economic position. After Mr.
Fortuyn’s assassination at the hands of a (certainly angry and white) environmental radical only a week before the
elections, a shock went through the Netherlands and Europe. What was happening in the Netherlands? Was this
model  of  consensus-building (the  so-called Poldermodel)  falling apart?  Was Mr.  Fortuyn’s rise  part  of  a  wider
European shift towards the right and just another link in the chain of Haider-Le Pen-Berlusconi that seems keen to
build a Fortress Europe in order to keep the great unwashed safely outside Europe’s borders?
It is clear that the upsurges in conservative attitudes all around Europe tend to focus on the issue of immigration
and the combined ideas that the flood of immigrants and asylum-seekers are threatening economic prosperity and
national identity. The simple fact that in a decade or two the majority of the population of Dutch cities will have
non-Dutch roots is considered a source of concern. Where the most popular name for boys in the Netherlands used
to be Jan, it is now Muhammad. Mainstream political parties—whether classical left or right—have shied away from
openly  and honestly  discussing these  concerns and have  thus failed to  develop policies  to  address them. Mr.
Fortuyn’s star could only rise because he made these issues the core of his political programme. As a real populist,
his “solutions” were overly simplistic and difficult to realise. For example, he suggested that the Netherlands should
leave the Schengen-regime and return to a purely national policy on immigration, visas and registration-cum-control
of foreigners. He also proposed that the Netherlands should organise a national referendum on the enlargement of
the European Union (EU), so that the Dutch people could make up their mind about the merit of taking in more
countries.
Mr. Fortuyn’s movement (modestly called “Lijst  Pim Fortuyn”, of LPF), was the big winner of the parliamentary
elections. With 26 seats (in a 150-seat Lower House of Parliament), the LPF has become a major player, although its
raggle-taggle  structure  and  maverick  character  make  it  an  uncertain  factor  in  Dutch  politics.  The  Christian
Democrats (CDA), under the leadership of its new party chairman Jan Peter Balkenende, have been the other victors
with a surprising 43 seats. The new coalition will be formed together with the conservative-liberal party VVD, who
actually lost the elections (from 38 to 24 seats), but without whose participation a right-wing coalition would be
unmanageable. What does this shift to the right mean for the role of the Netherlands in the EU (and Europe at
large), and how will if affect Dutch politics and policies towards Europe?
The conservative shift in Dutch politics reflects the disconcern and uncertainty of the Netherlands about its place and
role in both Europe and the wider world. The moorings and clichés of the past no longer hold. The Netherlands used
to be both a staunch ally  of the US within  NATO and —as a founding member of the EU— one of  the firmest
supporters of further European integration. With the end of the Cold War, the departure from the Dutch guilder, the
development  of  a  European  Security  and  Defence  Policy  (ESDP),  and  the  prospect  of  both  NATO  and  EU
enlargement, it has become increasingly unclear how Dutch national interests should be formulated and protected.
Traditional sacred cows had already gradually lost their virtuous qualities, and may now well be unceremoniously
slaughtered by the current government. This should not be qualified as revolutionary per se, but as testimony that
the Netherlands, like many other EU member states, is in a reflective mood, reconsidering its roots and minding its
core business of optimalizing its national interests.
Europe should therefore expect a more nationalistic Dutch attitude which will be reflected, amongst others, in less
support for the (supranational) European Commission, and more for the (intergovernmental) Council of Ministers. As
a small country with a medium-sized economy, the Netherlands has much to lose financially. In an enlarged EU, the
Netherlands may be out-voted too frequently for comfort, especially on sensitive issues like immigration and asylum,
on  agriculture  and transportation,  and on  key  issues such  as fiscal  and budgetary  policy.  With  much  to  lose
financially and politically, the Netherlands will want to have a stronger say on how to share the EU’s cake and with
whom. In particular, the financial  consequences of EU enlargement will  be carefully screened by any new Dutch
government, and additional obstacles may be created for applicant countries whose membership of the Union would
damage the Netherlands’ economy. At the same time, The Hague will  certainly not give the Commission a carte
blanche on the now totally obsolete understanding that only the Commission can defend the interests of the EU’s
smaller member states.
The most likely coalition is a centre-right cabinet formed by the CDA, LPF and VVD, led by Jan Peter Balkenende.
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The LPF now calls for a general coalition agreement which leaves sufficient room for debate on policy issues amongst
the coalition partners, as well as in  parliament. This is a departure from previous practice, where a very detailed
coalition agreement assured relatively friction-free government at the price of the quality of debate in parliament.
Under these changed circumstances, the Netherlands’ policy towards Europe will be more eclectic and hence less
predictable. Although the governing parties are all to the conservative/right of the political spectrum, their attitudes
and affection for things European are as mixed as can be.
The CDA under Balkenende will no doubt be the most Europhile. Balkenende himself has made many pro-European
remarks, even calling for  a EU along federal  lines in  order  to defend European values and interests. The VVD
traditionally calls for modest European integration as long as the economic and financial benefits are clear. It came
as no surprise that a few weeks before the elections, the VVD leader Hans Dijkstal even questioned the economic
merits of EU enlargement. The VVD also calls for a more stringent Dutch policy on immigration and asylum, and
hence for a stronger role of the EU since this goal can only be achieved by Europe and through measures at the
European level. As the new kid on the Dutch political bloc, the LPF will remain an unknown quantity for the coming
months. If Fortuyn’s books are read as the LPF’s informal party programme, this would make this party the most
Eurosceptic  of  the  coalition.  Fortuyn  had  frequently  called  for  the  abolition  of  the  European  Parliament,  the
renationalisation of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), more controls on goods and persons on the EU’s
internal borders, quitting the Schengen agreement, as well as turning the EU into a club of sovereign states rather
than aiming towards a federal Europe. According to the late Fortuyn, a true democracy can only be achieved on the
national level, and not in a European context.
The  new Dutch  coalition  therefore  covers  a  relatively  wide  spectrum of  policy  towards Europe.  One  can  only
speculate in which direction Dutch policy will  go on individual issues. Given that even under the previous Dutch
governments a more critical attitude towards the EU was taking shape, European partners may want to get used to a
more conservative Netherlands, less prepared and willing than before to engage itself fully in continued European
integration. On the other hand, given the LPF’s political greenness and lack of practical experience in the difficult
process  of  Dutch  government-by-coalition,  it  remains  likely  that  even  Fortuyn’s  followers  will  be  prepared to
compromise for the sake and glory of political power. The Dutch political system remains remarkably stable, even
after the conservative shake-up of last May. Clearly, it will have the flexibility and strength to accommodate young
Turks like the LPF, not only on domestic matters, but also on issues of European policy.
This does not  mean that  on  some issues the LPF  will  not  want to put  a  clear  and recognizable stamp on  the
Netherlands’ policy towards Europe. This became clear immediately after the elections, when the present LPF leader
Mat Herben called for the reshuffling of the Dutch representation in the Convention on the future of the EU. Herben
complained that Hans van Mierlo (who is generally considered to be the spiritual  father of the so-called Purple-
government which has ruled the Netherlands the last eight years) is no longer an acceptable spokesman for the
Netherlands in  the Convention, and should be replaced by someone more in  line with the contemporary Dutch
political temperament. Other key decisions, such as the future replacement of the ageing F16 fighter aircraft, are
also likely to hinge upon the LPF. Herben, who has worked with the Dutch Ministry of Defence for two decades,
seems keen to put the LPF’s weight behind the US Joint Strike Fighter  (JSF). This would shift  the Netherlands
slightly more to the US military-industrial camp, although it would be an exaggeration to read any Euroscepticism
into such a (possible) decision: a good-quality Dutch airforce would be a bonus for any international force, be it led
by NATO or the EU.
The conservative mood in the Netherlands therefore reflects not so much scepticism towards the EU, but a reflection
on the role and place of the country in Europe and the world. By voting for the LPF, the electorate has called for a
time-out, rather than a stop, or even a U-turn. That this sentiment is widely shared across Europe and reflected in a
more conservative shift in countries such as Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain, France and perhaps in future Germany,
indicates  that  EU  member  states  are  in  the  process  of  redefining  their  role.  Should  they  continue  on  the
rollercoaster of EU federalism and happily shed their sovereignty? Is “Europe” really the only option to guard their
security and guarantee their prosperity in times of globalisation? Even if this is really the case, mainstream political
parties will have to explain to their electorate better than before why they should sustain their commitment to the
European  project.  Obviously,  even  a  well-off  country  like  the  Netherlands  has a  surprisingly  big reservoir  of
discontents that are more than willing to vote for someone who promises “change” and a return to the “Dutch roots”
(whatever they are). When (not if) the economic downturn becomes reality, the soil for these emotions will become
more fertile and anti-European feeling will inevitably grow in a commensurate way.
The conclusion should therefore be clear: the EU should take serious steps to become more relevant to “its” citizens;
it should explain what it does and why; it should make a consolidated effort to “sell” itself to the people in order to
create  an  emotional  relationship with  those  who are  confronted with  its policies.  This is  now also realized by
European political leaders like Gerhard Schröder, José María Aznar, Tony Blair, as well as EU officials (e.g. Prodi and
Verheugen). They have made it clear that the EU should be sensitive to the call for more effective and stringent
immigration and asylum policies in a consolidated effort to keep voters away from the extreme right. This is also the
key task of the new Dutch government. It also implies that the Dutch conservative revolution is very likely to peter
out sooner rather than later; Dutch political culture being—luckily—too boring and bland to sustain a continuous
level of high emotions. But if even the Netherlands, this emblem of moderation and common sense, is susceptible to
populism and Euroscepticism, the future of a European federation-of-sorts looks bleaker than ever. And not even the
latest Commission proposal can change this reality.
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